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The thinking which encompasses both reasoning-in-itself and reasoning-for-itself,
called “aprioristic thinking” by Hegel, is the freest form of thinking. This form of
thinking is imparted to the physical sciences by philosophy. Only under this condition
can physics obtain deeper scientiﬁc knowledge.
In the beginning of the last century, the renowned scientist
Anri Bergson [1] gave an advanced notice: “We experience
now one of the greatest crises; all our thinking, all ethics, all
life, all our spiritual and moral existence are in a condition of
intellectual fermentation...”. This fermentation, according
to the opinion of the known philosopher Edmund Husserl [2],
occurs due to installation dominant in positivistic and natural-
istic philosophy. This installation of ordinary consciousness
contrasts the human consciousness and being to each other,
and, therefore, not taking into account consciousness, can
lead to more crisis the European sciences. As pointed out
by Husserl, the sciences about the nature can be founded only
by means of phenomenology, as a strict philosophy, which
is oriented towards a ﬁrst-hand experience of consciousness.
Though many years have already passed since then, as these
scientists have written, resolute turn in this question is not yet
present. Even, in spite of the fact that in one of the achieve-
ments of modern physics — in quantum physics — the con-
sciousness of the observer has found a place for itself. In
the interpretation of quantum mechanics, the most important
upshot of this for physicists is that this problem is related to
the problem of consciousness — an interdisciplinary problem
concerning not only physicists, but also philosophers, psy-
chologists, physiologists and biologists. Its solution will re-
sultindeeperscientiﬁcknowledge. Butallthesame, forsome
reason, scientists very often in case of scientiﬁc cognition
neglect questions of the interaction between our conscious-
ness and the surrounding world. If we wish to reach fuller
scientiﬁc knowledge, we should not deal with physical phe-
nomena and thinking (consciousness) itself separately. The
well-known physicist Wigner [3] maintains that the separa-
tion between our perception and the laws of nature is no more
than simpliﬁcation. And though we are convinced that it has
a harmless character, to nevertheless merely forget about it
should not be the case. It is clear that deeper scientiﬁc knowl-
edge should include in itself a problem of the theory of cog-
nition — a problem of the origin of knowledge and a logical
substantiation of the relevant system of knowledge.
In deciding upon this problem, the cognition theory con-
siders the connection between “I”, my consciousness and an
external world, and says that the decision is concealed in the
interactionbetweensensualityandreason. Reasontransforms
our feelings into thoughts and it means that the representa-
tions are replaced with concepts. If science does not wish to
be, as it was described by Hegel [4], a simple unit of data
then, of course, it should have concepts and should operate
with them. But, if science also does not wish to be positivis-
tic (all sciences, except philosophy, are positivistic) then it
should have a rational basis and beginning. Only in this case,
does the sole purpose (aair) of science become the concept
of the concept. (Hegel has distinguished between the sciences
as follows: 1) sciences, as a simple unit of data, 2) the ex-
tremely positive sciences, 3) positive sciences, 4) philosophy.
Positivism of a physical science is that it does not know that
its deﬁnitions are ﬁnal).
Physics, certainly, has a rational basis which is intimately
connected with philosophy too. But what prevents a physical
sciencefrombecominga“mere”philosophy? Hegelhaselab-
orated on the notion of a positivistic side of the sciences. In
physics, this positivism is characterized by the lack of knowl-
edge that its deﬁnitions are ﬁnal and therefore there is no tran-
sition into the higher sphere. This ﬁniteness is connected with
the ﬁniteness of the cognition (feeling, belief, authority of
others, and authority of external and internal contemplation).
However, it is perhaps meant so to happen, as described
by Hegel, that thoughtful contemplation, lowering casual
conditions and organizing everything, will present the gen-
eraloutline before adetailed intellectual exposition. It is clear
then that an intellectual physical science will picture a ratio-
nal science of Nature in the form of an image which is the
external image of Nature. This image is called a physical pic-
ture of the world, or, as called by Max Planck [5], the world
of a physical science. Planck has explained further about it:
“...We are compelled to recognize behind the sensual world
the second, real world which leads independent existence in-
dependent of the person, — the world which we not can com-
prehend directly, but we comprehend via the sensual world,
via known symbols which he informs us, as if we would con-
sider a interesting subject only through the glasses, optical
properties of which are absolutely unknown for us”.
Thus, according to Planck, there are three worlds: the real
world, the sensual world and the world of a physical science
or a physical picture of the world. The real world is the world
outside us, it exists irrespective of our understanding of its
laws, i.e. irrespective of our consciousness and therefore it is
the objective world. The sensual world is our world because
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we perceive it through our bodies of perception: eyes, hear-
ing, charm etc., and it is subjective (it is possible to tell that
it is illusion). A physical picture of the world is the world
in which can be reﬂected both real and the sensual world.
This world is a bridge for us with which help we study the
world around. Reﬂection of the real world in the world of a
physical science is a physical picture of the real world; it is
also possible to describe the quantum world and the science
studying this world is the quantum physics. The reason why
the real world is the quantum world is because the so-called
world of atoms and electrons, as Planck has given above, ex-
ists independently of the person. Reﬂection of the sensual
world in a physical picture of the world is a physical picture
of the sensual world (the classical world) and the correspond-
ing science is the classical physics. Thus, only in case of the
thoughtful contemplation can the physics can be concerned
with the philosophy of nature.
But when will it be possible to tell, whether the physical
science is not simply concerned with philosophy, and even
enters into it, to a certain extent it? Based on a well-known
classiﬁcation of all sciences by Hegel, the nature philosophy
is a science about an idea in another-being. Hegel has thus
said: “what is real, is reasonable”, referring to understanding
inthecontextoftherealityofareasonableidea. Suchareality
is the maintenance of Hegel’s philosophy. Hegel writes that
phenomena, being unstable (random) and existing in continu-
ous ﬂuidity, are in contrast to the idea and do not enter into it.
Therefore Hegel takes the idea as the maintenance of his phi-
losophy. In the ancient time, Plato too spoke about ideas [2].
He wrote: “In a horse, in the house or in the ﬁne woman there
is nothing real. The reality is concluded as a universal type
(idea) of a horse, the house, the ﬁne woman” [6]. Plato con-
ﬁrms the continuous ﬂuidity of all existing forms and asks
the question: can the philosophy be within continuous and
chaotic ﬂuidity? As a result, the human knowledge is possi-
ble only under the condition of the existence of steady ideas,
and with the help of it, is possible to distinguish between
things based on ﬂuid validity and to plan in it any logical or-
der. Hegel understands that an idea will be steady, if it will be
the reality of a “reasonable”. After all, only reason is steady,
absolute. But this is not only because it is so ingenious to
deﬁne ideas in the way Hegel did it. In “Metaphysics”, Aris-
totle, criticizing Plato, asserts that the idea of a thing explains
nothing in the thing itself, even provided that the idea relates
to the thing, as found for example, in the fact that whiteness
concerns a white subject. Aristotle did not actually deny the
independent existence of ideas, but attributed to them the ex-
istence within things themselves. Namely, Hegel’s idea —
the reality of the “reasonable” — satisﬁes Aristotle’s require-
ment. Because, in such determination, the idea is taken from
the reality itself. But against Hegel’s reality the mind at once
acts. The mind says to us that ideas are no existing chimeras.
If science does not want to conceptualize its concept then it,
of course, will agree with the mind. Then, very ﬁguratively, it
is described by Hegel as follows: just as meal process is un-
grateful to the meal (simply eats it, not giving instead of any-
thing), similarly, thinking process will be ungrateful to apos-
teriori experience, and will simply give nothing in exchange.
In order to receive something from thinking process, it is nec-
essary to make the thinking itself by the subject of thinking.
Reﬂection transforms our representations into concepts. And
further reﬂections of concepts transform concepts into con-
cepts, i.e. it becomes clear as a concept. Only under such
conditions can the science understand its concept. However,
only in philosophy do we ﬁnd that the subject of thinking is
the thinking itself (for example, for the mathematician, it is
numbers, spaces etc.). The thinking, opposing with itself to
itself, is the reasoning-for-itself. Process thinking neverthe-
less is inside and consequently it is the reasoning-in-itself. As
a result, the “in itself” and “for itself” reasoning is the most
substantial form of free thinking and it is deﬁned by Hegel, as
aprioristic thinking. Only by aprioristic thinking can the gen-
erality and authenticity be found. Namely, in this thinking,
philosophy informs the maintenance of empirical sciences.
The obligation of the sciences is not to refuse this process,
because it is a very noble act for a science to reach the con-
cept of the concept. But the mind, objecting again, speaks to
us: “But what it can give to the physics? ”. At all times, there
have been physicists who, knowing about the ﬁniteness of the
knowledge of their science, have spoken about deeper scien-
tiﬁc knowledge [8–15]. They envision when it will be possi-
ble to speak about the physicist and about the consciousness
of the observer simultaneously.
Hegel has very interestingly written: “In the physicist we
too get acquainted with the general, with essence, the only
distinction between physics and the philosophy of nature is
that the philosophy of nature leads up us to the comprehen-
sion of the true forms of the concept of natural things”. But
doesn’t it mean that in deeper scientiﬁc cognition the physical
science has transited into a higher circle which is not present
in physics because of its positivism? And the answer to this
question is, of course, yes, it does. Thus, only under the con-
dition of deeper scientiﬁc knowledge can we claim that the
physical science is the philosophy of nature (in the sense that,
for example, the apple is a fruit).
Hegel deﬁnes the philosophy of nature, as a science about
an idea in its another being. As he writes, in philosophy we
do not learn anything else, except ideas, but the ideas exist
here as exterior forms. An exterior form of an idea is its an-
other being. Because the being of an idea (reasoning-in-itself
and reasoning-for-itself) takes place in the reason itself. Na-
ture receives its exterior, that exterior which we see, in the
exterior process of an idea. In fact, Hegel’s slogan “what is
reasonable, is real” is conﬁrmed.
Unwittingly, we could as well resolve one more problem.
The maintenance of philosophy, as Hegel writes, is an idea
which excludes from itself, the phenomenon, chance. But
the maintenance of physics is Nature, its phenomena. At the
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same time we may ask, “when can the physical science be-
come the philosophy of nature?” All becomes clear when we
agree with Hegel, that Nature is connected with an idea, in the
sense that it is an idea in its another being. The laws of Na-
ture, discovered by our thinking about physics, are also ideas
– reasonables of reality.
Thus, as in the past, philosophy will continue to play an
important role related to the necessity for the sciences to en-
ter a higher level. Only in this case can the sciences avoid the
crisis about which Husserl has always warned us. As Berg-
son continues that which has been said in the beginning of
this article: “...The new system, more general, wider should
become the doctrine for many decades and even centuries.
These new principles should direct all our life on a new way
on which the mankind will approach to cognition of true and
to happiness increase at the Earth”.
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